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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
l\[()RONI F. BOTT, ) 
Plain tiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
A. ~f. REEDER, aka, ADOLPH M. 






ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Somehow or other it appears that the record on appeal 
and the transcript are separated, and thus references 
herein will appear as follows: (R) will refer to the lower 
court's clerk numbering of the Record, and (Tr.) will 
refer to the pages of the court reporter's page number-
ing. The word ''files'' refer to the entire record on ap-
peal. 
It seems that this case involves more of a factual 
situation as found by the lower court, than one involving 
questions of law. 
The files show that the last day in court in this matter 
occurred on July llht, 1961 (Tr. 60). Counsel will no 
doubt admit, even though the following events do not 
appear in the files, that on the next day, July 12th a 
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2 
cashier's check for the sum of $2,621.58 was drawn to 
the order of the Clerk of the District Court at Brigham 
City, in final payment of the purchase price of the 
property in question. Mr. Reeder or his counsel accepted 
the check and delivered a warranty deed in favor of 
plaintiff, which deed was delivered to the clerk of court. 
Mr. Reeder obtained from the clerk the cashier's check, 
and Mr. Bott received from the clerk the Reeder war-
ranty deed. 
It appears from the files that there was misapprehen-
sion in the lower court's mind concerning the matter of 
interest, for he says: (Tr. 60-61) "I've had the reporter 
check the record and the court is about to eat crow. I 
want to say in the record that Mr. Reeder in his testimony 
stated that he wanted no more than the amount due, and 
the reporter couldn't find anything in the record to show 
me that Reeder had ever gone to Bott and talked to him 
about an extension of time or stated that because of Mr. 
~iason that he rouldn 't get the title quieted, and the 
record seems to be silent as far at Bott is concerned. 
There was never anything said. So I subscribe to the 
doctrine of la\Y that you presented, ~[iss Hansen, but 
I can't find the facts to justify it. I 'II announce that'::. 
the law, but there had to be something happen there, and 
neither Reeder nor Bott testified to an~Tthing. Now if 
there is anything, you point it out. n 
It should be born in mind at the time of this "Triting, 
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that ~I r. Reeder has not yet cleared the title to the 
property. 
Turning again to the files (Tr. 62) and quoting from 
one of the attorneys (Miss Hansen) for appellant: "We 
admit he ( 1\f r. Reeder) testified at the time that THEY 
1\UREED THERE \VOl'LD BE NO INTEREST. WE'-
LL E\'"EN AD~flT TO ~\ FINDING FACT." (mine). 
In pursuancP to this statement Miss Hansen pre-
sented to the court (R. 81) a proposed finding No. 5 
a~ follows: 
• 'G. That at the time the Defendants delivered to 
the plaintiff the said Memorandum of Sale it was 
agreed by the Defendants that there would be no 
interest charged on the sale price until ninety 
days after tender of a deed by Defendants.'' 
The court made its finding No.5 (R. 86) as follows: 
"That at the time of the conclusion of the trial of 
said matter, and up to and including the 27th day 
of June, 1961, at 12:00 o'clock noon, no such tender 
of such deed had been made hy the said A. M. 
Reeder to the Plaintiff,'. 
Then the court made a finding as to interest: 
(R. 76) '' ... and that the parties further agreed 
that the purchase price should bear no interest, 
and that until the expiration of ninety days after 
the said A. )f. Reeder had tendered to Plaintiff 
a Warranty Deed to such premises, and that after 
such a ninety day period, the balance of such 
purchase should bear interest in favor of the 
said "'"\. :Jf. Reeder at the rate of four ( 4%) per 
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cent per annum until payment of the full pur-
chase price.'' 
Let us now look into the record about this matter of 
interest. On cross examination by Mr. Hansen (witness 
-Moroni R. Bott, father of plaintiff) stated (Tr. 30-31): 
'' Q. You say thia last time that the agreement 
then was that there was to be no interest or rent. 
Was there another time, another meeting when 
the parties - A. We went from the courtroom 
(referring to some previous trial) here over to 
George Mason's office and that's where I deliver-
ed the check to George ~fason, and Dolph (~Ir. 
A. M. Reeder) and George agreed both that they 
should be no interest or rent at that time until - -
Q. Do you remember the conversation that took 
place~ 
A. That Dolph didn't want any interest mention-
ed or something because - - - Q. ''!ell, would you 
just answer my question? Do you remember what 
conversation took place, ~[r. Bott' A. Yes, I re-
meinber it. Q. And do you remember "Tho said 
what' A. Well, George said there \Yould be no 
interest and no rent, and Dolph (1fr. A. ~f. 
Reeder) did too. 
There was so1ne good reason for this question of "in-
tere~t '' that had a bearing on the closing or administra-
tion of an estate that .. A . ttorne~~ George ~fason was 
handling. Frankly·, the real situation does not appear in 
the files, but it ~eems to stein from some settlement of 
an estate in the name of "Holl~T". This appears on page 
31 of the transcript, "There the follo,ving took place: 
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( ( 
1ross X - 1\[oroni Bott senior) Q. \\"'.as there 
an~? eonversation hy? ~f r. Reeder 1 Did he sa~v 
anything? A. Well, he mentioned at that ti1ne he 
didn't \\rant any interest on the whole thing or 
~omething. Q. Who did he mention that to1 A. 
The four or five of us were there together and 
his first 'vife (l\f r. Bott Jr.) was there. Q. You 
~a~~ you 1nentioned it to George Mason. A. Yes. Q. 
\Yell, \Yasn 't George l\f ason the one that would be 
charging him interest on the property if it was 
brought up·~ A. We agreed there would be no in-
terest''. 
Again, let us find upon what ground the court below 
1nade its finding as to the matter of interest: 
(Tr. 33-34) "Q. (cross examination by Mr. Han-
~en) N O\V, \Yhat did he say about rent and interest 1 
(refering to defendant, n1r. Reeder) A. Well, he 
said there would be no rent or interest until he 
could deliver the title.'' 
The court below comments in his oral ~tatement: 
( Tr. 41) ''Now as a corollary to that, I find that 
the parties agreed that there was to be no in-
test until ninety days after Mr. Reeder tendered 
the deed. Now I can't draw any other con-
clusion. nf r. Reeder \Ya~ honest enough to take 
the stand and sa~? it was about as te~tified, and 
I take it that '3 'vhat he meant." 
STATEMENT OF POINT 
That the lower court did not err in finding and holding 
that defendants were not entitled to interest until the 
expiration 90 da~~s from date of tender of deed. 
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ARGU~1:ENT 
The most apt language the writer has found is con-
tained in the New Mexico case of City v. Southwestern 
Public Service Co., 161 P. 878 (at p. 884, lower right 
column): 
''The parties either did or did not agree that the 
deferred balance of $130,000 was to be without 
interest. The trial court found there was an agree-
ment not to pay interest based upon the intention 
of the parties at the time the contract was signed. 
The finding cannot be said to be without support 
in the evidence. The stipulation in the electric 
franchise ordinance that the installment payments 
were to be 'without interest' unquestionably evi-
dences this agreement and intent.'' 
Opposing counsel cite only one Utah case in support of 
their position - Farns\vorth vs. Jensen (p. 12 of the 
brief) -and this case is not in point because of the 
recitation of facts by the Court : ( p. 5 72, lo\\Ter right 
colu1nn). 
''The con tract and note both provided that the 
yearly pa~T1nents \vere to include interest on the 
deferred balance at the rate of six per cent per 
annum.'' 
It should be ren1e1nbered that the \vritten agreement, 
Ex. P. 1 (R. 7f)) is dated .. August 31, 1943, and that in 
the sa1ne ~Tear plaintiff applied to ~r r. Christensen of 
Beneficial Life Insurance (Tr. 35-36) to secure a loan 
on the property in payn1ent of the purchase price, the 
application for "Thirh loan \vas not approved because 
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~lr. HPP<lPr 's title to the property· to be conveyed, was 
not Ina rketable. 
Appellants and their attorneys agree \vith the position 
of respondent, with the findings and conclusions, and 
the decree of the lower court, as set out on pages 2 and 3 
of their brief: 
"It \vas further agreed by the parties at the tilne 
Mr. Reeder delivered the memorandum to the 
Plaintiff that interest was not to be charged, ac-
cording to Plaintiff's witness, until 90 days after 
tender of the deed.·' And. 
"Defendents (p. 3) have no argument with either 
finding ( 1) that Reed-er was to give, in effect a 
\\'"arranty deed when he obtained a good title from 
Holleys, and (2) that the parties agreed there 
was to be no interest until ninety days after Mr. 
Reeder tendered the deed.'' 
~Ir. Reeder apparently agreed with the version of 
plaintiffs. (Tr. 14) "Q. When \Vas he to pay you the 
$4,000~ A. Well, when we got the deed with title. Q. And 
he hasn't got it ~'"et ·~ A. No. Q. So that the $4,000 isn't due 
until you deliver him title~ .r\. That's right.'' 
Further (Tr. 39) "Q. 'Veil, can you tell us what was 
said hy you and what was said hy the other parties there 
at the time 1 A. ''r ell, it's been stated, and that is about 
right. :\. I have no fault with the statements.'' 
As late as two ~'"ears prior to the trial Mr. Reeder had 
prepared a final written agreement concerning the 
same land, \\'"hich \va~ not signed hy the parties, but 
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which (Ex. 2) (Tr. 25) made no provision for interest. 
(Note: through some oversight the exhibits were not 
included in the record, and thus I am calling on my re-
collection and the Transcript - I will secure an order, 
if possible, to have the exhibits forwarded for inclusion 
in the record under 75 · (h) of the Rules. 
Under any conceivable theory of this case, all defen-
dants had to do to commence the running of interest, was 
to tender a deed to ~Ir. Bott, \Yhich he did not accomplish 
until forced to do so by an action for specific perfor-
mance. 
Opposing counsel refer to the equities of the case, ap-
parently without con~idering the facts of the agreement. 
This Court said in Salina Canyon Coal Co. v.- Klemm, 
76 lTtah 372, 290 P. 161: 
·~For the court to hold that Lehman or hia coln-
pany is entitled to interest for more than eight 
~~ears \vould be conYerting a perverted trust into 
a profitable investment for an unfaithful trustee 
at the expense of the beneficiar~~." 
The logic of that case, \Yhen applied to our case, ( \Yith-
out regard to the agreen1ent of the parties as to non-
pa~~nlent of interest) is that l\~I r. Reeder should not be 
put in a position where can con1pel Bott to pay him in-
terest hy· his own failure to tender a deed until forced 
to do so by· court order. 
It is \Ye1l to point out here that appellant 1nention~ 
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the t'aet, several titnes, that Reeder could not give a 
deed, bPeause he did not have title. This could be mis-
leading, because what the parties were referring to was 
the fact that there was somP kind of a cloud on the title, 
that Heeder was trying to remove by an action to clear 
the title (Tr. 17 thru 20). Reeder is still, at this time, 
so far as known, trying to get his attorneys, to clear the 
san1e title. Thus, he was in just as good a position to 
deliver a deed in 1943, as he was at the conclusion of the 
trial. 
It i~ significant to here point out that in defendants' 
.. Atnended Answer and Counterclaim (R. 71 to 73) they 
deny that the partie~ entered into a written contract, 
admit the exeeution of Ex. P-1, and then (R. 73) affirm-
atively allege that the parties entered into an oral con-
tract on August 31, 1~l!3. Then in their proposed findings 
(R. 80) they set up verbatim, the written contract (Ex. 
P-1). Unless the writer has overlooked some evidence 
there is not onP 'Yord indieatin.g an obligation to pay 
interest, other than a~ found by the court below that the 
purchase price was payable within 00 days after delivery 
of the deed, and that thereafter, if default be made by 
plaintiff (and no default appears), he was to pay interest 
at -t%. 
The "'riter is omitting the citation of cases where there 
is a ~pecific agreement, either oral or written, to pay 
interest. 
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Counsel for defendants in their brief seem to com-
plain about the matter of some statements made by the 
lower court (Appellants brief, p. 3, 4 and 5) being in-
consiatant with the final findings and decree. Hurriedly 
we point to the case of Williams v. Kinsey, 169 P. 2d 487 
(Cal.). 
''It is settled that inconsistencies between the 
written or oral opinion of a trial judge or his 
antecedent expressions and the findings of fact 
cannot be considered by an appellate court." 
Counsel point on page 6 of their brief: 
"It is important to note that ,,~hile the parties 
agreed that interest waa not to be charged until 
after tender of the deed, there was no contract, 
or agreement, either written or oraL 'Yhich speci-
fied there would be no interest charged regardless 
of any contingencies that might arise.'' 
The writer does not find one word in the evidence as 
to the cause of the 17 year delay in clearing title-the time 
is now going on to 19 years There is no explanation. The 
only certanit~,. is that this long delay 'Yas through no 
fault of l\fr. Bott. Thus, ",.e haYe nothing before this 
(~ourt that could bring any of the equities into play as 
contended h),. opposing conn~el. 
The case of Pett),. Y. t ila rk, 113 f'" tah 205, 192 P. 2d 589 
was mainl)r a case involYing- the fact as to 'Yhether an 
interest provision in a contract had been "Xed', out 
but the contract did provide for a +0 day grace period 
in thP pa),.ll10nts under the agreement. ~ince the lower 
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court in our ease found as a fact, and admitted by de-
fendant~, that the agreement was that the purchase price 
~hould dra'v interest only if the same be not paid within 
90 da~~~ after deliver~~ of the deed, the Petty case on the 
1natter of intere~t i~ in point: 
''The interest provision of this contract provides 
that the defendant 'shall have forty days grace 
on any payment, and the past due payments shall 
bear interest at the rate of 1 per cent per month 
until paid.' Since the grace period is provided 
for as part of the interest provision we conclude 
that the parties intended that the interest should 
not commence to run on any installment or un-
paid part thereof until after the expiration of 
this forty day grace period and then only on the 
unpaid balance until paid, and that no interest 
shall be paid on interest." 
Defendants call upon principles of equit~v to aid them 
in their claim. It i~ so, that equity may in certain cases 
reform a contract to correctly express the agreement 
and intention of the parties. But, it is doubted that 
equity has ever reformed an agreement or contract con-
trary to the intention and agreement of the parties. 
~either has equity ever made an agreement for the par-
ties. They must make their own agreement. Reference is 
again made to the cross examination hy" ~fr. Hansen 
(Tr. 33): 
"What did he (Reeder) say about rent and in-
terest f (mine) A. ''Tell, he said there would be no 
rent or interest until he could deliver the title''. 
In conclusion~ the \vriter stresses the fact that cases 
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dealing with the matter of interest, the payment of which 
is provided for in the agreement itself, are intentionally 
omitted herefrom, as not in point and would unduly 
lengthen this brief. 
Respectfully submitted. 
Geo. D. Preston 
Geo. W. Preston 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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